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Effects ofHorse-Race Coverage
on Campaign Coffers:
Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries

Diana C. Mutz
University of Wisconsin-Madison
The quantity of "horse-race" coverage of political campaigns has been amply documented, but its
consequences for the dynamics of campaigns are less well understood. This study examines the effects
ofmediaportrayalsof public support for candidates on the behavior of potential campaign contributors.
This relationship is tested in the context of the four leading Democratic presidential primary candidates
in 1988. A time-series analysis of contributor behavior suggests that horse-race spin—that is, the extent
of media coverage suggesting a candidate is gaining or losing political support ^helps determine the
frequency of campaign contributions. Consistent with previous research, some contributors are motivated to donate by coverage suggesting that their strongly favored candidate is losing ground, while
other candidacies benefit from coverage suggesting increased viability. Overall, findings suggest that
strategic considerations weigh heavily in decisions to donate money to political candidates.

o,

'bservers of American electoral behavior have long assumed that everyone
loves a winner. This principle also has been assumed to apply to the behavior of
campaign contributors. In 1932, an analysis of incentives underlying campaign
contributions claimed that people "give much as they put money on a winning
horse" (Overacker 1932, 190-91). More recent elections abound with claims that
perceptions of public support bring with them tangible benefits in the form of
financial contributions. This is popularly claimed to have occurred for Carter in
1976, for Anderson in 1980, and for Hart in 1984 (Pomper 1989), although the precise mechanism or dynamics of the proposed effects were never documented.
Horse-race campaign coverage, that is, news emphasizing who is ahead or behind, or gaining or losing ground, is the primary means by which people develop
perceptions of the extent of mass public support for candidates. Although the extent of horse-race coverage has been well documented and widely disparaged as a
pernicious force in contemporary American politics (see, e.g., Johnston et al. 1990;
Brady and Johnston 1987; Broh 1977; Patterson 1980), researchers understand
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little about the concrete consequences it may have for the behavior of the American
electorate. In this study I hypothesize that one way in which media portrayals of
public support are important in determining the nature of campaigns is through
their influence on candidates' abilities to attract contributors and ultimately, to
finance a competitive race. Past research has focused on tbe translation of money
into electoral prospects, but little on the precursors or intermediary processes governing electoral outcomes. Since money plays a central role in candidates' abilities
to attain office, the dynamics of behavior leading to a healthy campaign war chest
are worthy of study.
Tbis study focuses on strategic contributing by primary activists in the 1988
Democratic presidential nomination campaign. Presidential nominations are an
ideal setting in which to examine this hypothesis for two reasons. First, the stakes
are very high; campaign finance regulations have reduced the importance of money
in general elections, but inadvertently have enhanced its role in primaries (Orren
1985). Second, horse-race coverage is most extensive in coverage of the sequential
presidential primary races (Arterton 1984; Brady and Johnston 1987). Moreover,
by encouraging mass fund-raising efforts aimed at attracting many small donations
from large numbers of individuals,' changes in campaign finance regulations have
further enhanced the importance of mass media in the process of winnowing presidential aspirants (Traugott 1985).
The 1988 Democratic primary and pre-primary period provides an excellent
setting in which to examine effects of changing perceptions of public support.
With no clear front-runner, the "seven dwarfs" all needed money and greater visibility to create viable campaigns. Moreover, research on the impact of campaign
expenditures on vote choice in presidential primaries suggests that money matters
most when there are a large number of low viability candidates (Haynes and Gurian
1992), just as there were at the beginning of the 1988 Democratic primary season.
1 begin this examination of strategic contributor behavior by reviewing what is
known about motivations underlying decisions to give money to political candidates. Next, I establish the plausibility of strategic contributing by describing two
mechanisms by wbich perceptions of public support might guide people in deciding when and whether to donate. Finally, I specify and test a model predicting the
aggregate-level behavior of contributors to the four leading Democratic candidates.
Consistent with previous research, the extent and nature of strategic contributor
behavior is found to vary with characteristics of candidates' constituencies.
MOTIVATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE

Contributing to campaigns generally occurs along with other forms of political involvement (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1991), but the motives for general
'Candidates for the presidential nominations may accept no more than $1,000 from any individual
contributor and no more than $5,000 from any multicandidate committee (see Alexander and Haggerty
1987 for details). Upon qualification for matching funds, only individual contributions arc matchable,
and only up to $250 per contribution.
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political involvement are better understood than those specific to political contributing (Clark and Wilson 1961; Verba and Nie 1972; Heard 1960). Contributing
to a campaign typically involves motivations beyond simply vianting to elect a
given candidate. Beyond this, the most commonly proposed incentives all share an
emphasis on characteristics of the individual, whether it be the person's desire for
affiliation, influence, or personal gain.
Although individual predispositions play a necessary role, contributing money is
likely to result from an interaction between individual traits and circumstances in
the current political environment (Heard 1960). The past emphasis on stable personal traits in explaining decisions to contribute bas encouraged research focused
on whether people donate at all during a given election cycle rather than what motivates them at the time the actual decision is made. In presidential primaries the
timing of these decisions is crucial to a campaign's survival.
Since individuals can give relatively little directly to a primary candidate's campaign, they are unlikely to do so for purposes of some personal favor in return. As
Jacobson and Kernell (1983) suggest, individual contributors' motives center more
on psychological than tangible rewards, Of the potential psychological rewards,
solidary motives are generally believed to be tbe most important (Brown et al.
1991); people give money out of a desire to maintain social contacts, to gain social
recognition, and to avoid social isolation. The conventional wisdom among politicians and pundits echoes this belief:
"The main reason people give to political campaigns is because they don't want to say no to the
person who asked them" (Werth 1988: 38), Brownstein(1987: 46) concurs: "For the most part,.,
the forces involved are local, personal; for many , , . the decision is not whether ro support Bush
over Kemp or Dole . , ., but whether to reject a direct request from their friend." (Biersack et al.
1992)

Because of the inherent social pressure, face-to-face requests generally are believed
to be most effective for raising contributions, with telephone and direct mail lagging behind due to their more impersonal nature.
To the extent that the power of personal influence dominates the process of inducing people to donate, one would not expect media coverage to play much of a
direct role in encouraging donations.^ As Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, 185) explained in their seminal work. Personal Influence, personal channels can produce
considerable social pressure, while media cannot. One might argue that Katz and
Lazarsfeld did not have contemporary horse-race coverage in mind, and that they
would recognize the potential for similar social pressures to operate through mass
media given the current media emphasis on portrayals of public opinion. But when
media emphasize tbe horse race for public support, they generally portray tbe
opinions of diffuse, anonymous, impersonal others—not the close personal acquaintances capable of exerting traditional forms of interpersonal social pressure.
To the extent that decisions to contribute are driven either by the normative social
'For a discussion of potential indirect effects of horse-race coverage, see Henshe) and Johnston 1987.
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pressure of personal solicitation, or by personal traits of individuals, horse-race
media coverage should play a negligible role. However, perceptions of public support may affect potential contributors for an entirely different reason—^the desire
to maximize the impact of their potential contributions.
T H E VSTRATEGIC CONTRIBUTOR

Popular wisdom aside, what recommends strategic contributing as a likely pattern of behavior among political activists.-^ The direct analogy to strategic voting
provides one possible basis for tbis expectation: contributors may want to avoid
wasting their money on a candidate without a chance of winning, ¡ust as strategic
voters avoid wasting their votes on noncontenders. When potential contributors
are ambivalent about whom to support—as is often the case in crowded primary
races with difficult-to-differentiate candidates—they may use information about a
candidate's prospects to resolve their uncertainty and indecision about whom to
support, both financially and otherwise. In one anecdotal example of this phenomenon, a group üf contributors attempted to hire Gallup to assess the odds on
two candidates before donating (Dionne 1980).
Abramson et al. ( 1992) estimate that strategic primary voting occurs only around
10% of the time (cf Popkin 1991); however, strategic considerations might be expected in greater magnitude among the highly politically involved pool of potential
contributors. Simply by virtue of their extraordinarily bigh levels of political interest and knowledge, this group should be more likely to engage in strategic thinking {e.g., Bartels 1988). Contribution decisions also may be more strategic on the
whole than primary vote decisions because of the value of the resource being allocated; potential contributors may be more strategic wben they consider the possibility of tbrowing money—as opposed to single votes—away on a candidate who
has little chance of success. By tbe same token, contributors may enhance the return on their investments by donating to candidates whom they know to be receiving many other donations (see Jacobson and Kernel! 1983). Primary activists who
intend to vote for a given candidate, but wbo will not donate money until they are
convinced tbat their candidate has a solid chance of winning, are clearly not rbe fervent type of advocates that a candidate most desires. Sucb a contributor probably
finds other candidates well within the realm of acceptability as well, and thus is not
an ardent or impassioned supporter of his or her chosen candidate. At root, this
type of strategic contributor behavior stems from hesitancy and hedging on the
part of the primary activist; unless horse-race coverage portrays the candidate as
viable, he or she is not willing to make a monetary investment in tbe candidate's
campaign.
Interestingly, one finds precisely the opposite strategic assumption in the literature on direct-mail appeals. Here the operating principle is that contributors
are motivated by perceptions of decreasing mass support for their position. As
Kayden (1985) notes, "The small donor derives satisfaction—a moral uplift—from
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contributing to a campaign. The issues that provide satisfaction are apt to be issues
in which the donor is in the minority. After all, if one is in the majority, why
worry?" (95). Many direct-mail appeals include frequent references to the almost
certain demise of a campaign unless the recipient donates immediately. Outside the
context of direct-mail fund-raising, it is also common for candidates to vie for the
"underdog" role for similar reasons (see Adams 1983). The perception that a campaign is embattled and needs help may be an effective fund-raising tactic, particularly in determining the timing of donations. In the face of an imminent threat,
loya] supporters of a candidate may be prompted to give money by news that their
candidate is threatened or losing ground.
The plausibility of loyalty-based contributing among those strongly committed
to a candidate or cause is supported by closely related field and laboratory studies.
In fact, many studies of bandwagon phenomena have ended up demonstrating
strong underdog patterns ratber than movement in the direction of majority opinion (see iMarsh 1984 for a review). Movement in the direction of majority opinion
occurs mainly when information is low and commitment is weak, while an underdog pattern—whereby people intensify their commitment to a less-popular choice—
is more likely when people have high levels of information and well-formed,
strongly committed views (e.g.., Petty and Cacioppo 1979, 1981; Bartels 1988;
Chaiken 1987; Geer 1989; Kaplowitz et al. 1983; Patterson 1980). Studies in this
vein generally have focused on changes in attitudes or behavioral intentions rather
than actual behaviors. Nonetheless, the mechanism is perbaps even more compelling as a strategic consideration in contributor decisions; if one's chosen candidate is already doing quite well, what need is there to send additional money?
Although information about candidates in a large prenomination field tends to
be low, potential contributors—particularly at the primary stage—are likely to be
among the most actively involved and well informed (see, e.g.. Brown, Hedges, and
Powell 1980). These characteristics make loyalty-based contributing all tbe more
plausible; when highly committed voters are faced with information indicating a
majority or trend away from their viewpoint, they may stand steadfast, increasing
the intensity of commitment to their original views and rallying behind their candidate (see e.g., Fleitas 1971; Gaskell 1974; Ceci and Kain 1982; Mutz 1992; Price
1989).
Loyalty-based and hesitancy-based contributing represent two distinctly different predictions as to the overall pattern of contributing that will transpire. Nonetheless, when people make decisions to contribute that take into account perceived
viability—whether for reasons of strong loyalty to a candidate or hesitancy about a
candidate's chances—both deci.sion-making processes are highly strategic in nature. In both cases, potential contributors are making a concerted effort to allocate
their money more efficiently, either by not giving money to a primary candidate
unless they know he or she has a chance of winning, or by not giving money to a
candidate until they know he or she truly needs it to win. Conventional political
wisdom suggests that both loyalty-based and hesitancy-based strategic contributing
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occur, but there is little, if any, empirical evidence documenting which process is
most likely under what conditions.
CHARACTERIZING CANDIDATE CONSTITUENCIES

One would expect candidates' constituencies to respond differently to changing
perceptions of public support based on the nature and intensity of their support for
their chosen candidate. The weaker the strength of a constituency's support for a
particular candidate, and the less distinguishable that candidate is from other alternatives, the more likely potential contributors will be influenced by hesitancybased strategic considerations; if two or more candidates appear roughly equally
attractive, then viability should play a positive role in increasing the frequency of
donations. If all other things are perceived to be equal, primary voters will give
money to the candidate they think has the better chance.
Loyaity-based contributing should be more likely among candidates whose supporters are strongly committed to their candidacy, and whose candidacy represents
an ideological position distinct from that of other candidates in the party. .\ potential contributor with a strong ideological basis for supporting a candidate would
have good reason to respond to news of declining public support: switching to another candidate is a less attractive option because of the intensity of support for the
original one, and because the alternatives are likely to be very different ideologically from the preferred choice. These factors should make it more likely that a
supporter will rally behind his or her original preference.
What little evidence there is pertaining to the effects of perceptions of mass support on fund-raising is consistent with this pattern. In the 1988 Republican primaries. Mutz (1995) found that donations to Dole and Kemp were positively
related to the media-portrayed viability of these campaigns over time, while donations to Bush were not. Thus the also-rans were characterized by hesitancy-based
contributing, while the acknowledged front-runner was not, since his viability was
never in question. On the other hand, donations to Pat Robertson were negatively
related to the media-portrayed viability of his campaign, probably because his
highly committed supporters rallied behind him as his prospects began to fade.
Of course, all campaign constituencies include mixtures of different kinds of
potential contributors; supporters of a given candidate are never all of one cloth.
Nonetheless, it is possible to differentiate candidates and their constituencies based
on general tendencies in the pool of potential contributors. To formulate campaignspecific expectations for this study, I gathered information on supporters of the
four leading candidates in the 1988 Democratic primary (Dukakis, Jackson, Gore,
and Gephardt), including their intensity of commitment to the candidate and their
perceptions of these candidates' ideological positions.^
^The best data bearing on the perceived ideological positions of the candidates comes from the 1988
NES Super Tuesday study. Although the Super Tuesday study is not national in scope and data were
collected fairly late in the fund-raising season (January 17 through March 8, 1988), they remain the
best source of information on candidates' ideological positions.
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TABLE 1

INTENSITY OF COMMITMENT TO CHOSEN PRIMARY CANDIDATE

Gephardt
Dukakis
Gore
Jackson

Strongly

Moderately

Only Mildly

2.1

48
46
44
22

32
23
7

20
34

71

28

Source: National telephone poll of 1,000 registered voters done by Gordon Black for USA Today,
February 23-28, 1988. Percentages represent the proportion of each candidate's supporters who responded as indicated to this question: "How strongly do you favor (chosen candidate) for the 1988
Democratic presidential nomination? Strongly, moderately, or only mildly?"

Table 1 confirms popular impressions that Jackson had an intensely loyal following"*; only Jackson had an identifiable constituency "whose support he could count
on through thick and thin" (Cook 1989, 46). Although there is a large gap between
Jackson and the other three candidates. Gore's supporters were also surprisingly
strongly committed to his candidacy, with more than a 10-point gap between the
percentage of his supporters who were strongly committed, and those equally committed to either of tbe remaining two candidates.
The likelihood that a candidate's supporters will take viability into consideration
when making decisions about donating also should be a function of the ideological
distinctiveness of tbe candidate in the eyes of his supporters, Table 2 illustrates just
how distinctive each group of supporters perceived their respective candidate. Not
surprisingly, these groups had very different general perspectives on tbe candidates' positions. For example, Jackson supporters perceived tbe entire field of candidates to be particularly conservative, while Gore supporters perceived them to be
particularly liberal. Jackson supporters also discriminated fewer ideological differences among the candidates, with a range from lowest to highest of only threequarters of a point on a seven-point scale, whereas Gore supporters used almost a
full two-point range in ranking the same candidates.
For purposes of characterizing constituencies by the extent to which they see
their candidate as ideologically distinct, what is of interest is within-group differences in ideological attributions, ignoring differences in each constituency's use of
the ideology scales. The normalized distance scores shown in the third column of
table 2 make it possible to compare perceived ideological distinctions across the
four groups of candidate supporters. As shown by the boldface lines in table 2, perceived candidate ideological positions demonstrate a pattern similar to that for intensity of commitment. Of tbe four major candidates, Jackson and Gore were the
most ideologically distinct, witb distances of 1.19 and .94 to the nearest alternative
*These data were selected because they represent the earliest available assessment of the intensity
of supporters' commitment to their chosen candidates, and thus are the most applicable to the fundraising period studied here.
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TABLE 2

PERCEIVED IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS BY SUPPORTERS OF MAJOR CANDIDATES

Position

Distance to
Nearest
Candidate

Normalized
Distance
{2-scores)

.Among Gephardt Supporters (« = 189, range = 1.30)
Gephardt
4,06
.25
.00
Dukakis
3,58
,23
-.71
Gore
3.81
,23
-.71
Jackson
3.05
.29
1,41
Among Dukakis Supporters (n = 268, range = 1,16)
Gephardt
3.54
.26
1.20
Dukakis
3.80
,07
-.82
Gore
3.87
,07
-.82
Jackson
2.90
19
.45
Among Gore Supporters (n = 153, range = 1,82)
Gephardt
3,78
.46
,24
Dukakis
3.32
,46
,24
Gore
4.32
,54
.94
Jackson
2,77
.27
-1,42
Amongjackson Supporters (n = 211, range = ,72)
Gephardt
3,80
.10
.46
Dukakis
3.90
,03
-.83
Gore
3.93
.03
-.83
Jackson
3.66
,14
1.19
Source: 1988 NES Super Tuesday Study, Data are based on the major Democratic candidates,
deñned as those whose percentage support reached double digits. The first column represents the mean
ideological placement of the candidate in the first panel; higher scores indicate the candidate is perceived as more conservative. The second column represents the distance from the candidate placement
to the nearest alternative Democratic candidate within that group of supporters; the third column consists of normalized distance scores that can be compared across different groups of supporters.

candidates. Gephardt and Dukakis, on the other hand, were perceived by their respective supporters to be less ideologically distinct, with distances of .00 and -.82
to tbe nearest alternative candidate.^
Tbese data generally confirm Cook's (1989) assertions about the nature of tbe
various campaigns: Jackson's supporters were strongly committed to his particular
candidacy; Gore was successful in differentiating himself from the pack of Democratic contenders and attracting supporters on tbe basis of his stance as the more
conservative and hawkish candidate: "Other Democratic candidates were on a
basically similar wavelength. Only Gore—and then only occasionally—used the
'This logic assumes as its point of departure that ideology plays sotne role in influencing voter preferences in primaries (see, e.g., Lengle I98I; Polshy 1983),
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numerous debates to draw a sharp distinction between himself and the other candidates on the issues" (Cook 1989, 47). In contrast, Dukakis and Gephardt's campaigns emphasized nonideological appeals sucb as managerial skills, leadership,
energy, and independence.
In a sense, all of the "seven dwarfs" in 1988 were also-rans whose campaigns potentially could be influenced by strategic contributor behavior. Variations in the
intensity of constituent support suggest tbat the constituencies supporting candidates Dukakis and Gephardt were especially likely to exhibit signs of hesitancybased strategic contributing given the lack of robust support that predominated
among tbeir constituencies, and tbe lack of distinctiveness in their perceived
ideological positions. Tbe strong commitment and ideological distinctiveness of
Jackson's supporters made his candidacy the most likely to exhibit signs of loyaltybased contributing. Tbe pattern suggested by Gore's supporters more closely
resembles the pattern of Jackson's supporters tban the patterns of either of the
other two candidates. Although the pattern is less clear for him, it suggests that, if
anything, bis campaign war chest should have been more susceptible to loyaltybased contributing than hesitancy-based considerations.

STUDY DESIGN

To document strategic contributing of either the loyalty-based or hesitancydriven variety, it is necessary to eliminate other, nonstrategic reasons that changes
in perceptions of public support might lead to changes in the flow of donations received by a campaign. As in studies of strategic voting, strategic motivations to
contribute are established indirectly by ruling out plausible alternatives. Figure 1
illustrates three potential mechanisms by which perceptions of public support for a
candidate could influence tbe aggregate number of campaign contributions a candidate receives at a given point in time. Tbe broken lines represent two paths to increased donations that are extensions of two varieties of momentum. In both cases,
tbe number of contributions is indirectly increased by expanding the size of a candidate's base of voter support. For example, as the diagonal broken line indicates,
to the extent that strategic voting increases a candidate's base of voter support, it
may thereby increase tbe flow of donations. Although one might assume tbat all of
a primary candidate's potential contributors would be tbose who supported him
from tbe very beginning, strategic voters are among the most well-informed and
politically active primary voters, thus making tbem likely campaign contributors if
they do, in fact, shift to another candidate's camp. Moreover, the long pre-primary
season replete with straw polls, endorsements, and local, regional, and national
polls means that even very early supporters may take strategic considerations into
account.
The path formed by the vertical and horizontal broken lines in figure 1 represents forms of momentum that are mediated by attitude change. To the extent tbat
perceptions of candidate support alter attitudes toward candidates (see Bartels
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FIGURE 1
T H E POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
ON POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
(AGGREGATE-LEVEL MODEL)

Attitudes
toward
C-andidate

î

.j_

Voter
Support

__

Perceived
Support
for Candidate

.''AC

y ^^^

>

Decisions
to
Contribute

^^" ..^-^^
^-••^..,UÛ*

-Al-l

-

Dashed lines represent forms of momentum that arc mediated by changes in attitudes toward candidates. Paths that do not deal with the translation of perceived public support into contributions have
been omitted, (For example, attitudes toward candidates will also influence perceptions of public support, and decisions to contribute are likely to intensify subsequent anitudes toward candidates,)

1988 for details), they may also increase tbe base of voter support which, in turn,
facilitates increased donations. Given the activist nature of political contributors,
and the fact that these types of momentum tend to characterize less-informed primary voters, this path is less likely to play an important role in altering contributor
behavior.
In this study I focus specifically on the relationship in figure 1 that has not been
examined in previous work; that is, the effect that perceived support for candidates
has on decisions to contribute that are not a result of changes in the size of a candidate's constituency.^ I use tbe term "strategic contributing" to refer to situations in
which perceptions of public support alter the flow of contributions directly, not by
changing people's attitudes toward candidates, nor by changing their preferred
candidate. Instead, media coverage of the horse race simply alters people's perceptions of an already-liked candidate's chances of victory, and thus facilitates strategic contributions. By explicitly controlling for changes in the size of candidates'
constituencies, I will eliminate the possibility tbat these other processes are responsible for relationships between changes in perceived public support and the flow of
donations.
*The indirect paths that could result in increased donations have been analyzed in Bartels's (1988)
studv of momentum.
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DATA AND MEASURES

Tbe dependent variables used in tbis study were constructed from information
on contributions to primary candidates available from tbe P'ederal Election Commission (FEC). Tbe FEC mandates that records be kept for all donations of two
hundred dollars or more. Instead of relying on cumulative data, I used records on
individual donations received by each candidate based on the date be was recorded at campaign headquarters. These data were aggregated by week to form
measures of the number of donations from private individuals each candidate received each week.^ Only contributions received by the candidate's principal campaign committee or another authorized campaign committee were counted toward
this total.^
Breaking down FEC data in tbis fashion makes it possible to use continuous
over-time variance in theflowof contributions as opposed to variance by candidate,
type of race, or year, as is most often tbe case. Nonetheless, since they are aggregate
data, they retain all of the requisite limitations in drawing inferences about individual motives and behaviors (e.g., Robinson 1950).
Since I am primarily interested in tbe processes underlying individual decisions
to donate, I used the number rather than the monetary total of donations received
each week. Cumulative amounts are clearly important, but tbe amount of a given
donation is more likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic factors such as personal
affluence, while the total number of donations should be more evenly influenced by
external factors.
In studying contributor behavior, it is important to begin a time series well before tbe primary season itself; the "exhibition" season is a crucial time during
which candidates must scramble to raise seed money if the campaign is to continue
(Orren 1985). Moreover, media are probably most influential in shaping public perceptions of support for candidates wben tbere are no actual primaries to guide
perceptions. In light of tbese considerations, I gathered data spanning a 42-week
period from July 1, 1987, through the date when the candidate was no longer in
the race.^
Horse-Race Spin
Since media-conveyed information about likely winners and losers is easily absorbed and recalled by the public (e.g., Robinson and Clancey 1985), perceptions
'This study includes transaction lypes 15 and 15E. Candidates' contributions to their own campaigns
(transaaion type I5C) are excluded from this analysis.
"To circumvent FEC limits, many candidates fund their preannouncement activities through candidate PACs rather than authorized campaign organizations. Although these organizations play a major
role in the preannouncement stage when individual donations to candidates cannot yei be matched, ihey
are a minor factor during the time period of interest here. Moreover, including donations to candidate
PACs in these totals did not change the nature of the relationships reported in this study.
•"The race was resolved during the same week for Dukakis, Gore, and Jackson; thus they have
[he same number of weeks' worth of data. However, Gephardt dropped out three weeks earlier, thus
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of public support for candidates were tapped by assessing horse-race coverage pertaining to each candidate's chances. '" The major television networks and nationally
oriented newspapers generally agree in their assessments of candidates' performance and prospects {Marshall 1983); thus it is safe to assume that newspaper
readers and television viewers receive essentially the same representation of the
primary race. Since the AP wire service crosses over both print and broadcast
media, it serves as an appropriate source to measure the "spin" on horse-race coverage surrounding individual candidacies. Media representations of candidate support were gauged using a computer-assisted content analysis of a random sample of
AP wire-service stories. For each candidate, one thousand stories were randomly
selected from the total pool of stories mentioning the candidate's name."
A computer-aided content analysis assessed the spin regarding whether the candidate was portrayed as winning or losing, gaining or losing ground according to
each paragraph (see Fan 1988; Nacos et al. 1991). The rules used to code the content took into account word and phrase combinations, the distance between words,
the order in which words appeared, and the presence of negatives or other concepts
in the paragraph. For example, in an analysis of Dukakis stories, "Dukakis . . .
outscored . . . Jackson" would be recognized as positive spin for Dukakis, while
"Jackson . . . outscored . .. Dukakis" would be scored as negative spin for Dukakis.
Similarly "Dukakis . , . outscored . . . by . . .Jackson" would be recognized as negative spin for Dukakis.'^ To create a composite measure indicating the amount of
positive spin relative to negative spin for each candidate, 1 constructed a weekly
ratio of the number of positive to negative spin news stories.'^

providing three fewer data points for the analysis of his campaign. The sample size of 1,000 stories per
candidate was reduced proportionately {n = 929),
'"Candidates' successes in primaries and caucuses typically have been lumped together with coverage
of them as if they were a single entity, Bartels (1988), for example, weights his measure of each candidate's cumulative primary vote share by the amount of coverage the subsequent week, .^ldrich (1980)
examines actual and expected performances specifically in publicized primaries. While there is nothing
inherently wrong with this practice, it does little to help disentangle the primary-driven and mediadriven components of this process, and it limits knowledge of the influence of perceived support to the
relatively shori primary season,
' ' The precise specification for the universe of stories from which each separate candidate sample was
drawn was any story including the candidate's first and last name (see footnote 9),
'^Coder attempts to differentiate references to whether candidates were ahead versus gaining ground
or behind versus losing ground proved impossible since most coverage seemed to blend the two. even
within single sentences- Coders aside, people in general apparently have a difficult time differentiating
state from trend information (Jencks 1991), thus suggesting that those consuming these media stories
will not differentiate either,
"For example, a p<»sitive (negative) spin story was defined as one which contained one or more paragraphs of positive (negative) spin. For more specific details on coding, please contact the author for the
complete list of rules. To assess the reliability of this procedure, a random subsamplc of 250 paragraphs
from the 1,000 stories for each candidate was coded by an independent human coder whose scores were
then compared to those generated by the computer program. This process resulted in approximately
85% of paragraphs classified correctly across the four candidates. Most errors were Type 11 errors; that
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Primary Outcomes

Indicators also were constructed to represent ongoing primary victories that
could directly influence public perceptions of the candidates' chances. Measures of
a candidate's "objective" probability of nomination were constructed from a ratio
of each candidate's cumulative delegates to date relative to the total number needed
to secure the nomination.''' A second indicator comprised the share of the primary
vote the candidate had won in the most recent primary. As Bartels (1988) argues,
public perceptions "respond with special force, at any given point in the campaign,
to the most recent primary results" (324). The candidate's cumulative percentage
of the primary vote to date served as a third indicator of accumulating support.
Although each of these three measures taps slightly different aspects of ongoing
primary events and their meaning, preliminary analyses indicated that they were
highly intercorreiated (r = .74). To avoid multicollinearity problems in further
analyses, they were normalized and combined into a single additive index representing primary outcomes.
The Campaign War Chest

Very few contributions are truly spontaneous; to receive contributions, most
candidates must ask. Their ability to make mass fund-raising appeals through direct mail or broadcast advertising may, in turn, be constrained by the size of their
campaign war chests. Ideally a model of contributor behavior would take into account the amount of money the campaign is spending on advertising, direct mail,
or other fund raising appeals. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to compile precise
data on the amount of money spent on fund-raising on a week-by-week basis (see
McBurnett 1991). But if one assumes that the percentage of the campaign budget
spent on such activities is fairly consistent across candidates, then the size of the
war chest itself can serve as a surrogate for fund-raising expenditures.''' Cook
(1989) reports that in 1988, candidates all adopted basically the same strategy,
starting early and focusing their energies on fund-raising during the exhibition season. Although this assumption may be tenuous at best, it allows some accounting
for the vast differences in initial availabilitv of resources.

is, they resulted from not scoring paragraphs that did involve horse-race considerations rather than inappropriately coding coverage that did.
'••Sources for this information included Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports and the ABC News
Bureau primary reports. Inconsistencies were resolved in favor of the more exhaustive source of information on primaries and caucuses, the .'\BCNews Bureau. Since these ratios are equal to zero before the
beginning of the primary season, these indicators are constant for all candidates during this period.
"This measure is the cumulative amount of money raised for the campaign since 1986 from individuals as well as political-action committees. F'or ease of interpretation, these figures are expressed in
hundreds of thousands. To the extent that personal solicitations are responsible for the bulk of contributions, fund-raising expenditures would not serve as a reliable measure of the amount of "asking" taking place.
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Amount of Media Coverage

Bartels (1988) suggests that momentum may occur because people "respond
quite unthinkingly to changes in simple political stimuli such as tbe frequency with
which candidates' names appear on television and in the newspaper" (HI). Still
otber research suggests that to the extent that simple amount of coverage plays a
significant role, it is often a negative one; surges in coverage that are not about a
candidate's success or failure in attracting public support often result from scandals or faux pas (e.g., Hagen 1992). To incorporate these possibilities, the same
samples of media content described earlier were used to construct indicators of the
amount of media coverage received by tbe candidates over time by summing the
number of paragraphs mentioning each candidate each week. Since the original one
thousand stories per candidate are each random samples, all stories dealing with
the candidate that appeared during the study time frame should accurately reflect
increases and decreases in coverage of each candidate over time.
Voter Support
Indicators of vote choice were gathered from national polls conducted throughout the study period. The percentage of a candidate's support was drawn only from
polls that asked such questions of appropriate nationwide party subsamples.'*
These measures were included in the model to ensure tbat the ebb and flow of contributions did not result from momentum simply enlarging the pool of voters supporting a particular candidate.
SPECIFYING A MODEL

Unfortunately there are no extant theories of contributor behavior to guide construction of an explanatory model (Jones and Miller 1985). Interestingly, the numbers of contributions to the 1988 Republican candidates were found to be positively
related to one another over time, thus suggesting tbat increases in donations to one
candidate did not drive donations to others down as one might have expected
(Mutz 1995). Instead, the same general over-time trends seemed to influence all
candidates at any given point in time.
A preliminary examination of the dependent variables in this study conñnns
tbat there are strong "seasonal" influences on political giving. Figure 2 shows tbat
the peaks and valleys in tbe number of contributions different candidates received
"•Each candidate's competitive advantage in poll standings was calculated for each time point by
computing the average amount of support for all candidates using that particular version of the question, and then calculating the percentage point advantage to the individual candidate. Polls were obtained from the Roper Archive's Public Opinion Location Library. When more than one poll was done
in a particular week, the average was used. When no new suitable polling data were gathered in a particular week, the previous week's indicator was used. Fresh data were available for all but seven of the
weeks covered in the time series.
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FIGURE 2

NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO FOUR LEADING
DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES BY WEEK

Dukakis Donations
Gore Donations
Gephardt Donations
Jackson Donations

generally occurred together. Increased donations for Dukakis, for example, do not
appear to drive contributions to the other candidates down. Instead, forces outside
of the individual campaigns—perhaps media attention to the campaign in general
or factors tied to family cash flow—appear to drive the general pattern of donations
over time.
To take these fluctuations into account, regression equations predicting the
number of donations to each candidate controlled for the average number of donations received by the other primary candidates that particular week. My goal in taking into account increases and decreases that affect all candidates is to eliminate tbe
shared over-time variance due to seasonal factors; an increase in tbe number of donations a candidate receives from one week to the next is only meaningful to the extent that it is greater than tbe increase tbat would be expected due to factors
influencing all candidates. Thus, the remaining variance represents eacb candidate's competitive advantage in individual fund-raising relative to the fund-raising
successes enjoyed by his opponents at the same point in time.
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Ideally it would be possible to identify lag structures for each independent variable and tben isolate tbe exact time of the contributor decision in relation to them.
However, tbe lack of theory and previous research bearing on these relationships
makes tbis approach impractical. Instead I constructed a very general model designed to incorporate lags appropriate to a range of fund-raising techniques.
Keeping in mind that donations are dated according to when they are received at
campaign headquarters, and that much fund-raising occurs through the mail, it
seems unlikely that a pronounced effect from a change in perceived viability would
be visible in as short a period as a week. This suggests a minimal lag of at least two
weeks before one could expect the result of changes in horse-race spin to show up
in checks at headquarters.
According to direct-mail experts, almost all of the responses to a request for
money will be returned within three to four weeks of the original request (approximately five weeks after the initial mailing), or not at all. Combining these two observations, and taking into account the fact that the checks must then be logged in
•at headquarters, the time frame in which one could safely expect a contributor response to be registered in these data would be in the range of two to five weeks.
Thus, tbe independent variables described earlier were lagged to create measures
representing the average amount of media spin, size of war chest, amount of coverage, etc., during the period two to five weeks before the week donations were
recorded at campaign headquarters. Using rolling averages makes it difficult to estimate decay rates or points of peak influence, but it allows for tbe fact that different, yet simultaneous methods of collecting donations would function at somewhat
different lags.'^
RESULTS

As might be expected, autocorrelation of tbe error terms necessitated a two-step
full transform (EGLS) method to take into account first-order autoregressive processes '" (see Judge et al. 1980 or Harvey 1981 for details). Tbis procedure resulted
in Durbin-Watson statistics within acceptable ranges for all four candidates (see
Johnston 1972).
"Using Dukakis as an example, the hypothesized relationships arc described by the equation:

where_y,(D, = the number of donations received by candidate Dukakis at week f
q = the proposed time lag of two to five weeks
a = a constant
Xi(,-„ = the ratio of positive to negative media spin two to five weeks prior
Xi(,-^, = the index of objective probability of nomination two to five weeks prior
Xj(,_^i — the total amount of coverage the candidate received two to five weeks prior
X^,,_,, = the size of the candidate's campaign war chest two to five weeks prior
"sd-yi - 'he amount of voter suppon two to five weeks prior
Xfcj,) = the average number of donations received by all candidates at week t
1«Durbin-Watson statistics were 2.19, 2.26, 1.49, and 1.47 for Gore, Gephardt, Dukakis, and
Jackson, respectively.
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TABLE 3

PREDICTORS OF DONATIONS TO CAMPAIGNS

WITH WEAK

CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT

Gephardt Campaign
Coefficient
Intercept
Gephardt horse-race spin
Gephardt voter support
Primary outcomes
Amount of media coverage
Size of war chest
All-candidate trend

46.15
98.23
41.20
96.26
-1.16
9.10

.43

Total R^

.64
2.73
3.00
1.81
1.72
1.54
2.03

.64
Dukakis Campaign
Coefficient

Intercept
Dukakis horse race spin
Dukakis voter support
Primary outcomes
Amount of media coverage
Size of war chest
All-<andidate trend
Total R^

T-T3Ú0

156,94
121.66
58.51
-40.42
-1.93
8.81
2.36

7"-rat i o

.94
1.81
3.16

.18
1.40
2.90
8.73

.76

Note: Coefficients are iterated Yule-Walker estimates. Dependent variable is the number of donations to a candidate-authorized campaign committee, Gephardt .V = 39, Dukakis A' = 42. R^ represents the measure of fit of the structural part of the model after transforming for the autocorrelation.

As indicated in table 3, the dynamics of donations to the Gephardt and Dukakis
campaigns were similar in many respects. The frequency of donations to both
campaigns was partly a function of an increased pool of voters. Both viere able to
boost the number of donations their campaigns received by bringing more voters
into the fold. The size of the coefficients corresponding to voter support suggests
that each percentage point advantage that Dukakis accrued over his competitors resulted in slightly less than 60 additional donations, while Gephardt gained slightly
more than 40 donations for a similar increase in his voter support. Dukakis also
clearly benefited from his early fund-raising successes. The size of his war chest facilitated still more successful fund raising efforts later in the primary season.
The horse-race spin presented in coverage of their campaigns had similar
significant effects, although the coefficient is marginally significant in Dukakis's
case {/> < .10). For Dukakis, the size of the coefficient corresponding to horse-race
spin suggests that in a week of media coverage with twice as much positive as negative spin, the Dukakis campaign could expect roughly 120 more donations relative
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FIGURE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO GEPHARDT
AND GEPHARDT MEDIA SPIN
Gephardt Media Spin

Gephardt Donations

&
O

to what would be expected with coverage balancing positive and negative spin. For
Gephardt, the coefficient for media spin is clearly significant, but slightly smaller,
suggesting around one hundred additional donations. The overall fit for the regression equations is fairly strong in both cases, with R^'s in the 60s and 70s. In general, then, the campaigns with weak constituency support demonstrated the predicted pattern of response to perceived candidate viability; supporters hedged their
bets when the campaigns did not appear to be faring well and donated more often
when the candidate's popularity was perceived to be on the upswing.
Figure 3 and figure 4 illustrate the simple bivariate relationships between media
spin and the number of donations to the Gephardt and Dukakis campaigns, respectively, In figure 3, the three peaks in contributions to Gephardt are each preceded by peaks in media spin. The positive spin forming a minor peak in late
August corresponds closely to the timing of a straw poll announced August 30
showing Gephardt running first in Iowa. This is followed by a similar peak in donations at approximately one month's lag. The second and largest peak in horserace spin is followed by a modest surge in contributions, again at approximately
one month's lag from peak to peak and valley to valley. The sharp dip in horse-race
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FIGURE 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO DUKAKIS
AND DUKAKIS MEDIA SPIN
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Spin in November closely corresponds to the release oí a Des Moines Register poll
showing Gephardt losing ground to tbe other candidates in Iowa. The third peak in
positive media spin occurred in January and was almost as high as the earlier peak.
It also was followed roughly one month later by several consecutive weeks in which
Gephardt attracted more than 250 donations.
In figure 4, the two major peaks in donations to Dukakis—in September 1987
and late February 1988—are also preceded roughly one month before by the two
most-pronounced peaks in media spin. In August 1987, optimism abounded, but
a series of mishaps in September apparently brought down the positive media
spin surrounding his campaign. In early September a financial disclosure report
showed that Dukakis had held stock in companies doing business in South Africa
until the previous year, even though he had signed legislation divesting state pension funds from firms with South African ties in 1983.'" On September 20, the
Boston Herald reported that Dukakis was in violation of campaign finance regulations. At the end of that same month, Dukakis's campaign director resigned after
"The time lines for major campaign events for Dukakis and for the other three candidates were obtained from "CBS News Campaign '88 Primaries and Caucuses, Book 2," which covers the entire time
period included in this study.
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admitting that he distributed a video maligning Biden to news organizations. The
effects of declining spin in September are clearly visible in the drop-off in donations in October,
Dukakis media spin bounced back in October and November as he won the New
Hampshire caucuses and came in second in a series of CBS/Nea> York Ttmes polls,
both nationally and in Iowa, and first in a New Hampshire poll. Tbe campaign remained buoyed through December as he accumulated endorsements from many
mayors and city council members, and was dubbed one of the top six governors and
"the leader of the innovation pack" by U.S. News and World Report.
The highest peak in Dukakis media spin was in January 1988. During this
month a poll of New Hampshire Democrats conducted by Gallup for the Boston
Globe showed him retaining his wide lead; moreover, a Des Moines Register poll
later in tbe month showed Dukakis in a three-way tie among Iowa caucus participants. This peak in positive spin dropped off and then leveled out at the beginning
of February when Dukakis came in third in the Iowa caucuses, just as the peak in
donations in late February dropped off and leveled out in early Marcb. Even some
of the more minor peaks in Dukakis spin are-mirrored by small increases in donations from October through January, although the pattern is less pronounced during this period.
As table 4 illustrates, donations to tbe Jackson and Gore campaigns followed a
far different pattern. As hypothesized, horse-race spin was a significant negative
predictor of donations for both candidates. However, the size of the coefficients in
table 4 indicates that these negative effects were of a much smaller magnitude than
the positive effects observed for Dukakis and Gephardt. Jackson and Gore gained
only around 20 or 30 additional donations from having their campaigns portrayed
as threatened or losing ground, while Gephardt and Dukakis gained nearly one
hundred or more donations in response to equivalent shifts in horse-race spin.
Although there is some evidence corroborating the idea that strongly supportive
constituencies rally behind their candidates in times of need, the strength of tbis
strategic pattern pales in comparison with that of candidates witb weak constituency support. The amount of media coverage also had a significant impact on
donations for both candidates, but as in previous studies, results were mixed;
amount of coverage was negatively related to Jackson donations but positively related to Gore donations.
The overall fit for the Jackson equation is not nearly as good as for the other candidates {R^ = .48). The weakness of this model may result from several causes.
Research on the 1984 primaries has suggested that the media treated Jackson's candidacy fundamentally differently from other candidates (see Broh 1987), and the
same may well have occurred in 1988. The weakness of the Jackson model might
also resuh from the fact that many of Jackson's supporters were outside of the
Democratic party's traditional financial base and thus may bave been motivated by
different considerations. A still more likely explanation is that the FEC data are a
less accurate reflection of the total number of donations Jackson received than they
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TABLE 4

PREDICTORS OF DONATIONS TO CAMPAIGNS

WITH STRONG

CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT
Gore Campaign
Coefficient

Intercept
Gore horse-race spin
Gore voter support
Primary outcomes
Amouni of media coverage
Size of war chest
All-candidate trend

-46.93
-28.28
13.07
-88.61
1.00
6.41

.18

Total R^

.97
2.85
1.61
2.9Z
2.27
1.75
1.44

.67
Jackson Campaign
Coefficient

Intercept
Jackson horse-race spin
Jackson voter support
Primary outcomes
Amount of media coverage
Size of war chest
All-candidate trend
Total R^

T-ratio

68.70
-19.99
3.22
76.02
-.41
8.49

.03

r-ratio
2.13
2.54
1.56
3.20
2.33
1.60
1.06
.48

Note: Coefficients are iterated Yule-Walker estimates. Dependent variable is the number of donations to a candidate-authorized campaign committee. N = 42. R- represents the measure of fit of the
structural part of the model after transforming for the autocorrelation.

are for other candidates. Jackson's campaign probably attracted a greater number
of smaller donors that the FEC records do not take into account.^"
In figure 5 one can see the inverse relationship between media spin and Gore
contributions very clearly. The peak in media spin in early August is followed by a
dip in contributions a few weeks later. The decreasing positive media spin Gore received in late September is followed by increased contributions in early October.
And so the pattern continues in figure 5, with the peaks and dips in donations always slightly to the right of the opposing peaks and dips in media spin. Gore received his most positive media spin in January 1988 while he was picking up key
endorsements, but this plunged to pessimism in early February as Gore came in
dead last in the Iowa caucuses.
^"Unfonutiately there are no reliable sources of information on contributions less than $200, nor is it
possible to ascertain precisely what percentage of the total number of contributions fell under this limit
for each candidate. Based solely on the demographics of their constituencies, one would expect Jackson
to have a larger percentage of small contributions than the other candidates.
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FIGURE 5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO GORE
AND GORE MEDIA SPIN
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The coefficient for Jackson media spin is similar though slightly smaller, but this
negative relationship is not as clear from the simple trend lines shown in figure 6.
The peak in media spin in mid-September is followed by a small dip in donations
in early October, and the peak in media spin in November is followed by a drop to
an all-time low for donations in mid-December. But once the primary season begins, the pattern looks as if donations lead media spin rather than the other way
around.
The three peaks in Jackson media spin coincide with some major turning points
in the Jackson campaign. The September 1987 peak corresponds to Jackson's endorsement by Chicago Mayor Harold Washington. The increasingly negative spin
in October corresponds to media coverage of Jackson's alleged anti-Semitism and
accusations that he had been "coddled" by the media thus far in the campaign.
Media spin climbed again in late October as Jackson was said to lead the Democratic pack according to a 27 October CBS/New York Times national poll. This
same ranking was confirmed in a 29 November CBS/Nea? York Times poll. The
death of Harold Washington in late November and ensuing criticism surrounding
Jackson's role in selecting a new mayor brought media portrayals of Jackson's viability down. By mid-December it reached an all-time low at about the same time
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FIGURE 6

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO JACKSON
AND JACKSON MEDIA SPIN
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that the Alabama Democratic Conference cast doubts on Jackson's electability.
Jackson's performance in the Iowa caucuses, the New Hampshire primary, and the
Minnesota caucuses showed steady improvement with each contest and substantial
improvements over his performance in 1984. This pattern is mirrored in the
steadily more positive spin during this time period.
In addition to the interpretation suggested by loyalty-based contributing, there
are several plausible rival interpretations of the relationships between media spin
and contributions depicted in figure 5 and figure 6. First, there is clearly no evidence in either case that positive media spin brings about increased contributions;
only if one considered illogically long lag times such as two to three months would
the peaks in media spin and contributions begin to suggest the pattern that characterizes hesitancy-based contributing. Second, although the idea that contributions
might be driving media spin is plausible—particularly based on the data from
Jackson's campaign—it seems highly unlikely when one considers the actual process that would have to transpire. Reporters use fund-raising success as a benchmark for judging candidate popularity, but reliable information on fund-raising
progress is not available to reporters on a continuous, ongoing basis. The FEC has
a small number of filing deadlines spaced many months apart and thus cannot
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possibly account for the continuous similarity of the trends. Moreover, candidates'
own ongoing claims about fund-raising successes are treated by reporters with understandable suspicion and given little news play, precisely because they fear being
used by candidates to instigate bandwagon-type phenomena (Arterton 1984).
Nonetheless, I attempted to eliminate this possibility by reexamining the relationships in table 3 and table 4 after removing from the sample of horse-race coverage all media coverage explicitly dealing with campaign finance. Results were
virtually identical to the original ones. To tbe extent tbat coverage of fund-raising
influences positive and negative spin, this relationship is indirect; fund-raising announcements may trigger more positive or negative spin in campaign stories on other
topics, but the stories on campaign finance themselves are not driving these effects.
Nor is horse-race spin merely a surrogate for the results of the latest publicopinion poll. Removing all poll-based stories from the sample of coverage does not
change the relationships between horse-race spin and contributions, but polls may
still be having indirect effects on the tone of coverage in stories on other topics.
More generally, there is yet another rival explanation tbat could challenge a
causal interpretation of any of the relationships observed in table 3 and table 4. As
with most nonexperimental time-series data, it is always possible that some third
variable not accounted for in the model is driving both decisions to donate and
horse-race spin but at different lag times. For example, it is possible that policy
statements or endorsements both increase positive media spin and increase the flow
of donations independent of one another. In the case of events such as endorsements, it is doubtful that they could become known to large enough audiences
without media coverage; once covered, they become part of horse-race spin and
thus already are incorporated in tbe model. But coverage of things such as policy
proposals would generally not sbow up in horse-race coverage and thus are unaccounted for in the model.
A final consideration in evaluating the extent to which these findings can be
deemed causal relationships involves specification of the time lag. While variations
in the equations increase the strength of some relationships and decrease others,
the overall patterns remain robust unless the lag time is increased up to two full
months, an unlikely lag time for a causal sequence of this kind.
In short, the causal inferences that can be drawn from these relationships are
fairly strong relative to conclusions from cross-sectional aggregate and surveybased studies of contributor behavior. Time-series data make the direction of cause
and effect unambiguous, and reverse causation is highly unlikely. The possibility
remains that some third variable is driving both decisions to donate and horse-race
spin, but it is difficult to envision something of this sort that has not been accounted for in the model, and that would produce these effects at lagged intervals.
Nonetheless, some caution should be exercised in generaUzing from these findings to other contexts. Although these patterns do not appear to be specific to political parties, they might be specific to the 1988 presidential primaries or to these
particular candidacies. However, the consistency of the pattern of findings across
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the eight candidates in 1988 suggests that they are likely to generalize fairly well to
post-reform presidential primaries, though these same patterns may not obtain for
congressional or general-election contests, or when media coverage de-emphasizes
horse-race aspects of the process.
DISCUSSION

Current information about the political contribution activities of the mass public
is largely limited to problematic survey-based self-report measures and cumulative
data on entire election cycles. Although the FEC data on contributor behavior have
their own shortcomings, this information makes it possible to use over-time variance in contributions to study the impact of factors other than stable personal attributes or characteristics of entire races or election cycles. The timing of decisions
to contribute to primary campaigns is especially important since even a lot of
money too late will be of little use to candidates, except in retiring campaign debts.
The results of this study suggest that giving money is a decision that often
involves strategic considerations. To the extent that contributors are motivated
by strategic considerations, mass media portrayals of the opinions of others may
influence the decisions of potential contributors. Just as this consideration is sometimes important to people's vote choices, it is also important in determining the
flow of money into campaigns.
However, the way in which perceptions of public support matter is probably more
complex than popular wisdom might suggest. Just as there is ample evidence of both
underdog and bandwagon reactions to representations of mass opinion, evidence to
date suggests that both positive and negative horse-race spin may motivate contributors under different conditions. Although horse-race coverage is often decried,
news about changes in candidate status may draw potential donors' attention to the
campaign and act as an important motivating force fueling a campaign's progress.
The extent of strategic contributing documented in this particular election is
probably a conservative estimate of what actually transpired. One reason to suspect
that it represents a low-level baseline is that in an effort to insure that donations increased due to strategic motivations on the part of preexisting supporters, I controlled for changes in constituency size that may also be serving as strategic cues.
Moreover, the conditions necessary to observe loyalty- or besitancy-based strategic
contributing in aggregate data are only present when the pool of potential donors is
dominated by one or the other type of supporter. Simultaneous strategic contributing of both varieties may cancel one another out as a candidate's fortunes wax and
wane over time.
From a normative perspective, tbese findings paint a fairly complimentary picture of primary activists. Just as not wanting to give money to a candidate who does
not have much of a chance is a highly calculated basis on which to make a political
decision, it is also well considered and logical to want to give money to a wcll-liked
candidate when the candidate is in need and while the money still has a chance

1040

Diana C. Mutz

of helping him or her. In this sense the political reasoning observed in this study
is of a highly evolved nature; horse race coverage may be a shallow and lazy form
of election coverage, but primary activists are anything but lazy in the uses they
make of it.
Manuscript submitted 4 October 1993
Final manuscript received 19 January 1995

REFERENCES
Abramson, Paul R.. John H. Aldrich, Phil Paolino, and David W. Rohde. 1992. " 'Sophisticated' Voting
in the 1988 Presidential Primaries." ^^mfriVün Political Science Review Sb:55—()9.
Adams, William C , ed. 1983. Television Coverage of the 1980 Presidential Campaign. Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Aldrich, John H. 1980. Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices m Presidential Nomination Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alexander, Herbert E., and Brian A. Haggerty. 1987. Financing the 1984 Election. Lexington: D.C.
Heath.
i
Arterton, F. Christopher. 1984. Media Politics. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Bartels. Larry. 1988. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Biersack, R., Paul S. Herrnson, L. Powell, Clyde Wilcox, and C. J. Brown Jr. 1992. "Seeking the Source
of the Money Stream: The Flow of Individual Contributions in Federal Elections." Presented to the
annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
Brady, Henry E., and Richard Johnston. 1987. "What's the Primary Message: Horse Race or Issue
Journalism.' In Aîedia and Momentum, eds, G. R. Orren and N. W. Polsby. Chatham, NJ; Chatham
House.
Broh, C Anthony. 1977 "Horse-Race Journalism: Reporting the Polls in the 1976 Presidential 'Election." Public Opinion Quarterly 41.51^-29.
Broh, C. Anthony. 1987. A Horse of a Different Color: Television's Treatment of Jesse Jackson's ¡984
Presidential Campaign. Washington, DC; Joint Center for Political Studies.
Brown, C. W., R. B. Hedges, L. W. Powell. 1980. "Modes of Elite Political Participation: Contributors
to the 1972 Presidential Candidates." American Journal of Political Science 1^.159-90.
Brown, C. W., L. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. 1991. "Solicitors of Money for 1988 Presidential Nomination Candidates." Presented to the annual conference of the American Political Science .Association, Washington, DC.
Brownstein, Ronald. 1987. "Raising Bucks for Bush." New York Times., 17 May, section 6, p. 42.
Ceci, Stephen J., and Edward L. Kain. 1982. "Jumping on the Bandwagon with the Underdog: The
Impact of Attitude Polls on Polling Behavior." Public Opinion Quarterly '\():11Í-'^1.
Chaiken, Shelly. 1987. "The Heuristic Model of Persuasion." In Social Influence: The Ontario Symposium, voi. 5, eds. M. P. Zanna. J. M. Olson, and C. P. Herman, HiUsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.
Clark, P. B,, and James Q. Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization." Administrative Science Quarterly 6:138-46.
Cook, R. 1989. "The Nominating Process." In The Elections of 1988, ed. M. Nelson. Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly Press.
Dionne, E. J. 1980. "Experts Find Polls Influence Activists." New York Times, 4 May, p. 26.
Fan, David P. 1988. Predictions of Public Opinion from the Mass Media. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Fleitas, Daniel W. 1971. "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal Information Elections."
American Political Science Review 65:434-38.

Effects of Horse-Race Coverage

*

1041

Gaskcll, G, 1974, "Polls and the Voters," A'CH'J'WIWV 4:23-24,
Geer, John G. 1989, Nominaiing Présidents. New York: Greenwood.
Granberg, Don, and Edward Brent. 1983. "When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link
in U,S, Presidential Elections, \9S2-]9ii()" Journal nfPersiinality andSocial Psychoiiig_v4SAll-9\.
Hagen, .Michael G, 1992, "Press Treatment of Presidential Front-runners," Presented to the annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Science .Association, Chicago, April.
Harvey, .Andrew C. 1981, The Eciinnmetric Analyses of Time Series. New York: Wiley.
Haynes, A, A,, and Gurian, P, 1992, "The Impact of Candidate Spending on Vote Outcomes in
Presidential Prenomination Campaigns." Presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science ."Association, Chicago,
Heard, Alexander, 1960, The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Henshel, Richard L., and W, Johnston, 1987. "The Emergence of Bandwagon Effects: A Theory,"
SocwlogicalQuarterly 28 ; 493-511.
Jacobson, Gary C^,, and Samuel Kernell, 1983. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Jencks, Christopher, 1991, "Is Violent Crime Increasing?" The American Prospect Winter: 98-109.
Johnston, John, 1972. Econometric Methods. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill,
Johnston, Richard, Andre Biais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crete. 1990. "Do Campaigns Matter? The
Dynamics of the 1988 Canadian Election." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, .^pril.
Jones, Ruth S., and Warren E, Miller, 1985, "Financing Campaigtis: Macro-level Innovations and
Micro-level Response." Ifestern PuUticalQuarterly 38:187-210,
Judge, George G,, William E. Griffiths, R. C. Hill, and T, C. Lee. 1980. The Theory and Practice of
Econometrics. New York: Wiley,
Kaplowitz, Stan A., Edward L, Fink, Dave D'Alessio, and G. Blake Armstrong, 1983, "Anonymity,
Strength of Attitude and the Influence of Public Opinion Polls." Human Communication Research
10:5-25.
Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 1955. Personal Influence. Glencoc: Free.
Kayden, Xandra, 1985. "Effects of the Present System of Campaign Financing on Special Interest
Groups," In Before Nomination: Our Primary Problems, ed, George Grassmuck. Washington, DC:
.American Enterprise Institute.
Lengle, James 1, 1981, Representation and Presidential Primaries: The Democratic Party in the Post-Reform
Era. Westport, CT: Greenw<«»d,
Marsh, Catherine. 1984. "Back on the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Poils on Public Opinion."
British Journal of Political Science 15:51 -74,
Marshall, Thomas R. 1983, "The News Verdict and Public Opinion during the Primaries." In Televisiiin Coverage of the ¡980 Presidential Campaign, ed, W. C, Adams, Norwood, \ J : .\blex.
.McBurnett, Michael, 1991, "The Dynamics of Voter Preference in Primary Campaigns." Presented to
[he annual conference of the .Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.
.Mutz, Diana C, 1992, "Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion on Political
Attitudes." Political Behavior 14:89-122,
Mutz, Diana C, 1995. "Media, Momentum and Money: Horse Race Spin in the 1988 Republican
Primaries." In Potls and the News Media, eds. Paul J, Lavrakas, Michael W. Traugott, and Peter V.
Miller. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
Nacos, B. L,, Robert Y, Shapiro, J. T, Young, David P, Fan, T, Kjellstrand, and C, McCaa, 1991,
"Content Analysis of News Reports: Comparing Human Coding and a Computer-Assisted
Method," Communication 12:111-28.
Orren, Gary R. 1985. "The Nomination Process: Vicissitudes of Candidate Selection." In The Elections
of 1984, ed. Michael Nelson. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Overacker, Louise, 1932. Money in Elections. New York: Macmülan.
Patterson, Thomas E. 1980. The Mass Media Election. New York: Praeger,

1042

'

Diana C. Mutz

Petty, Richard E., and John T- Cacioppo. 1979. "Issue Involvcmenr Can Increase or Decrease Persuasion by Enhancing Message-relevant Cognitive 'Responses." Journal of Personality ami Social Psychology Í7:19] S-26.
Petty, Richard E., and John T. Cacioppo. 1981. Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary
Approaches. Dubuque: William C. Brown.
Polsby, Nelson VV. 1983. Consequences of Party Reform- New York; Oxford University Press.
Pomper, Gerald M. 1989, "The Presidential Nominations.'' In The Election of 1988: Reports and
Interpretations, ed. Gerald Pomper. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Popkin, Samuel L. 199!. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Price, Vincent. 1989. "Social Identification and Public Opinion: Effects of Communicating Group Conflict." Public Opinion Quarterly 53 ; 197-224.
Robinson, MichaelJ, and Maura Clancey. 1985. "Teflon Politics." In The Mass Media in Campaign '84,
eds. MichaelJ, Robinson and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Robinson, W. S. 1950. "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals." American Sociological
Review: 351-57.
Sigelman, Lee. 1989. "The 1988 Presidential Nomination: Whatever Happened lo .Momentum?" PS:
Political Science and Politics 22:35-39. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association,
Sorauf, Frank J, 1988. Money in American Elections. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Stone, Walter J,, Lonna R. Atkeson, and Sean Q. Kelly. 1991, "Candidate Choice on Super Tuesday:
An Expected Utility Approach." Presented at the annual conference of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, DC, September.
Traugott, Michael W. 1985. "The Media and the Nominating Process." In Before domination: Our
Primary Problems, ed. George Grassmuck, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Wenh, B. 1988. "The Incredible Rolodex." Nea> England Monthly. July.
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books.

Diana C. Mutz is associate professor of political science, journalism, and mass
communication. University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.

